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The effect of outbound foreign direct investment (FDI) on the national income of the
parent firm's country depends on the relative importance of two countervailing factors: the loss
of tax revenue to the foreign government and the increased use of foreign debt. The present
paper develops an explicit analysis of these two factors in the context of the segmented
international capital market in which most national saving remains in the country in which the
saving is done.
The analysis is applied with realistic parameter values for U.S. outbound foreign direct
investment. The calculations imply that an increase in outbound FDI raises the present value of
U.S. national income by a rather substantial amount.
Traditional analyses that conclude that the foreign tax credit causes excess outbound FDI
fail to take into account the fact that firms that invest abroad increase their use of foreign debt
as they increase the extent of their FDI.
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Firms that invest abroad pay taxes on the profits of their foreign subsidiaries to the
governments of the countries in which they invest. Outbound foreign direct investment thus
causes the government of the home country to lose revenue to the governments of the countries
in which the investment occurs. Because U.S. firms receive a tax credit for the taxes that they
pay to foreign govermnen&, the finns can be indifferent between taxes paid to foreign
governments and to the U.S. government. Although the firm can maximize shareholder value
by equating the after-tax return on capital at home and abroad, the loss of revenue to the foreign
government means that the interest of the multinational company and of its home country need
not coincide.
More specifically, the foreign tax credit causes the finn to invest abroad until the after
tax rate of return on the foreign investment is equal to the after tax rate of return on investment
at home. Since the United States receives the full pretax return on domestic investment (either
in the form of taxes or as income of investors), but only the after-tax return on the investment
'The tax credit is essentially limited to the amount of tax that would have been paid to
the U.S. government on the same pretax profits. This limit is affected by a variety of rules
(for measuring foreign profits and combining taxes paid to several countries) that will not be
considered in the current paper.
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1of U.S. foreign subsidiaries, critics of the foreign tax credit argue that it causesan excessive
amount of foreign direct investment and a reduction in U.S. national income.2
This argument fails to take into account the fact that firms that invest abroad increase
their use of foreign debt as they increase the extent of their foreign direct investment.3
Although each firms's overall leverage may be unaffected by the extent of itsoverseas
investments, the U.S. economy as a whole benefits from the use of the additional lowcost credit
supplied by foreign creditors. While such debt capital might in principle be availableto the
parent company and therefore to the benefit of the United States through international portfolio
investments even in the absence of foreign direct investment, the evidenceon the segmentation
of the global capital market4 implies that this would not occur inpractice. National saving does
not flow to foreign investment opportunities that offer higher rates of return. Theadvantage of
the foreign direct investment is that it permits the U.S. firms and the UnitedStates as a whole
to utilize foreign debt capital without requiring that capital to cross national borders.
There are several reasons why American firms increase theiruse of foreign borrowing
as they expand their foreign direct investment. First, such borrowing isa way to hedge the
2This criticism of the foreign tax credit was initially discussed inRichinan (1963) and
Musgrave (1969) and subsequently formalized by Dutton (1982). It has beenwidely accepted in the analysis of international tax policy;see, e.g., U.S. Joint Committee on Taxation
(1991). See also Hines (1992), Horst (1977, 1980) and Feldstein and Hartman(1979).
3The evidence presented in section 1 below shows that U.S.firms borrow approximately
one dollar from foreign sources for each dollar of equity iivested inforeign subsidiaries
(including reinvested retained earnings). By contrast, there is virtuallyno foreign source debt
in the financing of U.S. firms outside their foreign affiliates.
4Feldstein and Horioka (1980) showed that thesaving generated in a country tends to stay
in that country. That result has been verified fora variety of different countries, time periods
and estimation methods. See Frankel (1985, 1991) and therecent survey and analysis by Mussa and Goldstein (1994).
2fluctuations in the value of foreign profits due to fluctuations in currency values. Second,
interest allocation rules restrict the amount of U.S. domestic interest that firms can deduct in
calculating U.S. taxable income when they have overseas operations. The use of foreign debt
permits an interest deduction that would not otherwise be possible. l'hird, firms may be able
to borrow at a lower cost in countries where collateral is available. Fourth, firms can balance
the expropriation risk by using local debt to reduce the total net assets at risk in the foreign
location.
Regardless of the relative importance of these specific reasons for the link between
foreign direct investment and foreign borrowing, such borrowing is to the advantage of the
United States whenever the real after-tax cost of the foreign borrowing is less than the after-tax
return on the foreign assets acquired with those funds. The net effect of an additional dollar of
outbound foreign direct investment on the national income of the United States5 thus depends
on the relative importance of the tax paid to the foreign government and of the advantage
obtained by using foreign debt. The present paper presents a framework for calculating these
two effects and uses the framework to estimate the effect on U.S. national income of a marginal
outbound investment by a U.S. multinational company.6
The evidence presented below shows that the favorable leverage effect is likely to
outweigh the loss of revenue to the foreign treasury. When the firm equates the after-tax rates
use the term "national income" of the United States to include only income received in
the United States. The earnings of foreign subsidiaries are not counted until repatriated.
6The present analysis thus ignores the possible effects of foreign direct investment on the
country's terms of trade. See Kemp (1962> and MacDougall (1960) for a discussion of those
issues.
3of return on the domestic investment and investment in the foreign subsidiary, the national rate
of return to the United States is higher on the foreign investment than on the domestic
investment. This result is robust to a wide range of alternative parametric assumptions explored
in section 3.
This emphasis on the relative importance of foreign taxes and foreign debt is quite
different from the public debate about the desirability of foreign direct investment which has
focussed on the effect of such foreign direct investment on the demand for labor in the United
States. In its crudest form, the critics of outbound foreign direct investment argue that such
investment 'destroys American jobs" because the output of the foreign subsidiaries of U.S. firms
substitutes for exports from the United States while the supporters of outbound foreign direct
investment argue that such investment "creates jobs" because U.S. firms export more when they
have foreign subsidiaries. Economists recognize, however, that total employment in an economy
with a well-functioning labor market like that of the United States will not be affected by the
volume or character of foreign direct investment.'
A second confused aspect of the public debate about the appropriate tax policy toward
foreign direct investment has been the emphasis placed by the defenders of foreign direct
investment on the high profitability of some intramarginal investments in overseas firms. It is
undeniable that much foreign direct investment by U.S. multinationals is able to take advantage
of the firms' opportunities to earn supernormal profits based on patents, technical know-how,
'See, e.g., the comment of Graham and Krugman (1989) that "The net impact of foreign
direct investment on U.S. employment Li approximately zero, and the truth of this assertion
has nothing to do with job gains and losses at the industry level." (page 49; their italics.) See
also Lipsey (1994).
4brand names, etc. that cannot be fully exploited by producing at home and exporting or by
licensing or other means.8 But the relevant issue is not the average return on foreign direct
investment, but whether at the margin the volume of FDI is too high. That is the question that
the framework developed in the current paper can answer.
Section 1 presents some basic facts about the financing of investment in the foreign
affiliates of U.S. parents and about the extent to which outbound cross-border flows of foreign
direct investment displace domestic investment in the United States. Section 2 then develops an
analytic framework for the present value calculation and estimates the impact of a typical
outbound investment on the present value of U.S. national income. The third section extends
the analysis to deal with a more complex and realistic financial structure and then tests the
sensitivity of the results to a number of parametric changes.
1. The Financing of Foreign Affiliates and the Displacement of Domestic Investment
Evidence developed by the U.S. Department of Commerce in the 1989 Benchmark
Survey of U.S. Investment Abroad implies that only about 20 percent of the value of assets
owned by U.S. affiliates abroad is financed by cross-border flows of capital from the United
States. An additional 18 percent represents retained earnings attributable to U.S. investors. The
rest is financed locally by foreign debt and equity.
8See Froot (1993) for a recent discussion of the reasons for foreign direct investment.
Payments from the foreign affiliate to parent for the use of patents, royalties, etc.. are
deductible in calculating the taxable income of the subsidiary. The full pretax income is thus
transferred from the foreign country to the United States.
5Table 1
Sources of Finance of Foreign Affiliates of U.S. Parent Companies
Dollars Percent
(billions) of Total
External equity capital provided by the U.S.
parent and other U.S. investors $203 16.4
Debt provided by the U.S. parent
and other U.S. investors 47 3.8
External equity capital provided
by non-U.S. investors 92 7.4
Debt provided by non-U.S. sources 567 45.8
Retainedearnings of affiliates
attributable to U.S. investors 226 18.3
Retained earnings of affiliates
attributable to non-U.S. investors 102 8.2
Total $1327 100.0
All figures relate to majority-owned nonbank affiliates of U.S. nonbank parents. Analysis is
based on the 1989 Benchmark Survey of U.S. Investment Abroad published by the U.S.
Department of Commerce (1992). See the text and Feldstein (1994) for comments on inflation
adjustment and other modifications to the Benchmark data.
6Table 1 shows the sources of finance of the capital stock of U.S. foreign affiliates in
more detail. These figures refer to majority owned nonbank affiliates of U.S. nonbank parents.
The historic cost estimates for equity capital presented in the benchmark survey have been
adjusted to 1989 price levels.9
The total value of the capital stock of these U.S. affiliates at the end of 1989 was $1,237
billion. Of the 20.2 percent financed by U.S. investors, 16.4 percentage points were in the form
of equity investments and only 3.8 percent in the form of loans from U.S. parents and other
U.S. investors to these foreign affiliates. In contrast, the funds provided to U.S. overseas
affiliates from foreign sources were primarily in the form of debt: 45.8 percent of the total
$1,237 billion was financed as foreign debt and only 7.4 percent by foreign equity investments.
The remaining 26.5 percent of the capital stock was financed by retained earnings, with more
than two-thirds of this attributable to the U.S. equity investors. Section 2 of this paper uses a
simplified representation of the finance of subsidiaries that ignores U.S. debt and foreign equity
investments since these represent less than one-sixth of the total finance. A more complete
analysis is presented in section 3.
This distribution of the sources of finance of the assets of U.S. foreign affiliates reflects
an aggregation over individual foreign affiliates with different financing mixes at any point in
time. A typical foreign affiliate is likely to be financed initially by a transfer of equity and debt
from the parent firm combined with some local borrowing in the host country and possibly some
local equity investment. After an initial period of operation, the affiliate becomes self-financing,
9Feldstein (1994) discusses the price level adjustment and other smaller modifications of
the Benchmark data.
7using its own retained earnings and local borrowing to expand its capital stock. At first,
therefore, the financing mix of such an affiliate involves no retained earnings and a relatively
large share of parent debt and equity finance. As the affiliate ages, the external finance share
declines and the share financed by retained earnings increases. The observed mixture of
financing sources shown in Table 1 therefore reflects not only the particular leverage ratio of
typical companies but also the age distribution and growth rates of the affiliates.
From the point of view of the United States, the national value of a dollar of foreign
direct investment is the present value of the resulting flow of subsequent cross border payments
back to the United States. The principle component of this cross border flow is dividend
payments from the subsidiary to the parent; foreign affiliates of U.S. parents now repatriate
dividends equal to approximately 70 percent of their total reported earnings after foreign
corporate taxes)° The second component is the interest on the credit provided by the parent
and other U.S. sources. Against these must be offset any new credit transferred to the
subsidiary from the parent and other U.S. sources.1'
If the present value of these cross-border net payments to the parent firm exceeds the
'°Tablem.w.i in 1989 Survey of U.S. Direct Investment Abroad (U.S. Department of
Commerce, 1992) shows that nonbank affiliates of nonbarik parents paid dividends equal to
74 percent of reported earnings in 1989. Hines and Hubbard (1992) discuss the reasons why
foreign subsidiaries pay dividends to their U.S. parent firnis despite the apparent tax
advantage of postponing repatriation. They also report somewhat lower dividend payment
rates for earlier years. During the most recent years for which data are available (1990
through 1992), the dividends of all U.S. foreign affiliates averaged 70 percent of reported
earnings (U.S. Department of Commerce, 1993, page 88).
'tThis assumes realistically that the cross-border equity investment is made at the start of
the investment and that no subsequent cross-border equity investments are made. All
subsequent equity investments are in the form of retained earnings.
8present value of the U.S. domestic income that is foregone because of the investment abroad,
the foreign direct investment increases the present value of U.S. national income. Making that
comparison requires an estimate of the extent to which a dollar of outbound foreign direct
investment displaces U.S. domestic investment and of the return that would have been earned
on that investment.
Although there is no direct measure of the extent to which U.S. foreign direct investment
displaces U.S. domestic investment, indirect evidence suggests that on average each dollar of
cross-border outbound foreign direct investment flow reduces gross domestic investment by
approximately one dollar (Feldstein, 1994). More specifically, the experience of the major
industrial countries of the OECD indicates that an increase in the flow of cross-border outbound
foreign direct investment that is sustained for a decade or longer reduces domestic investment
by approximately one dollar for each dollar of outbound foreign direct investment)2
Although such one-for-one displacement would not be expected in a perfectly integrated
world capital market, it is consistent with the capital market segmentation documented in
Feldstein and Horioka (1980) and subsequent research)3 This capital market segmentation
view holds that savings generated in a country tend to remain and be invested in that country.
However, when a firm transfers funds abroad to finance overseas direct investment, that transfer
does appear to reduce domestic investment dollar for dollar. A simple model of corporate
'2This conclusion is based on a cross section regression of the decade-average ratio of
gross domestic investment to GDP on the same decade average ratio of outbound-foreign
direct investment to GDP in an equation that also includes a national saving ratio, an
inbound-foreign direct investment ratio, and several other variables.
'3See footnote 4 above.
9capital budgeting suggests why this may be true and why the reduction is not offset by a general
equilibrium capital market response. Consider a company in the United States that has a fixed
amount of after-tax profits. Its dividend payment is effectively determined by a dividend payout
ratio that reflectsthe standard practice within the industry and the expectations of its
shareholders. There is only very limited scope for adjusting the dividend payout ratio unless
there is an exogenous change in tax rules or other factors that alter the cost of dividend payment.
The combination of the retained earnings that remain after this dividend payment and the
company's desired debt to capital ratio determines the amount that the company can borrow and
therefore the firm's total funds available for capital investments.'4 The key point is that this
capital budget calculation is done for the multinational corporation as a whole rather than for the
individual subsidiaries.Any use of the firm's capital (including retained earnings and
borrowing) for foreign direct investments thus reduces the amount of capital available for
domestic investment within the finn.
Such a reduction in domestic investment
direct investment does not imply anything about
aggregate level of domestic investment within the
domestic investment opportunity that the firm
undertaken by another finn that would otherwise
the entire business sector is aggregated, it is clear
investment will reduce domestic investment by an equal amount if all firms use thetype of
'The size of this capital budget could of course be modified byissuing new equity
shares, repurchasing existing shares, or selling parts of the operating business. But such
actions would be unusual events and not part of the regular annual capital budgetprocess.
10
within a single firm that makes an overseas
the effect of aggregate outbound FDI on the
U.S. economy as a whole. For example, the
forgoes because it invests abroad might be
have invested those funds abroad. But when
that a net increase in aggregate foreign directcapital budgeting process described above.
It is possible, however, that this description of the capitalbudgeting process is too
restrictive. A sustained rise in total national outbound foreign directinvestment could in
principle leave domestic investment opportunities that induce firms to raise their debtto capital
ratio with the additional funds coming from abroad. In otherwords, the increase in outbound
foreign direct investment might in principle induce an offsetting inflow of portfoliocapital. The
effect of outbound foreign direct investment on total domestic investmentthus depends on the
extent to which portfolio capital is internationally responsive to investmentopportunities. The
Feldstein.-Horioka type evidence on the segmentation of capital marketssuggests that extent of
such offsetting international flows of portfolio capital is small. This inturn implies that each
dollar of aggregate foreign direct investment outflow reduces domesticinvestment by
approximately one dollar.
If each dollar of outbound FDI does reduce U.S. domestic investmentby one dollar, the
effect of the foreign direct investment on U.S. national income can be calculatedby comparing
the value of the displaced investment with the present value of therepatriated funds, discounting
at the pretax rate of return on the foregone domestic investment. Thepretax rate of return is
the appropriate rate for discounting the repatriated dividends because the relevantreturn on the
displaced investment is the return to the United States as a whole, regardless of how that return
is divided between investors and the treasury. If the repatriated flow from thesubsidiary to the
United States has a present value when discounted at the return on thedisplaced investment that
exceeds the amount of that displaced investment, the present value of U.S. national income is
increased by the substitution of foreign direct investment for the displaced domestic investment.
11In practice, this calculation is more likely to understate the net advantage of outbound
investment than to overstate it.Even if each dollar of outbound investment does reduce
domestic investment by a dollar, some of that investment is likely to be in owner occupied
housing or other fonns of capital that have a lower pretax return than investment in plant and
equipment. Similarly, if each dollar of outbound investment reduces domestic investment by less
than a dollar, the foreign investment would exceed its opportunity cost even if the present value
(when discounted at the pretax return on private investment) of the repatriated dividends per
dollar of outbound investment were less than one dollar.
2. The Net Present Value of Renatriated Dividends
This section presents a model of the foreign direct investment process and uses it to
calculate the net present value of repatriated dividends with a realistic set of parameter values.
The model presented in this section is simplified to make the analysis more transparent by
ignoring the debt provided from U.S. sources (3.8 percent of the total capital of foreign
affiliates) and the equity investments of foreign investors (15.6 percent of total affiliate capital,
including retained earnings). These are reintroduced in the analysis of section 3 together with
a variety of sensitivity analyses of the current section's results.15
Consider a U.S. parent firm that at time t=O makes an initial equity investment, E, in
a new foreign subsidiary. The subsidiary then borrows locally an amount B0. After this initial
investment, there is no additional transfer from the parent tcy the affiliate. Instead, the affiliate
This model is thus a stylized version of the analyses by Penrose (1956), Robbins and
Stobaugh (1973) and Sinn (1990).
12divides its annual earnings between dividends and retained earnings. The capital stock at the end
of the year grows by the investment of these retained earnings and of the additional debt that is
incurred in proportion to these additional retained earnings. Such a system evolves according
to the following system of equations:
If K is the capital stock of the affiliate at the end of period t, the gross pretax earnings
before interest expenses can be written
(1)G, =rK,.,
The rate of return on foreign subsidiary capital (r) will be taken to be the same as the pretax
return on such capital in the United States'6 and will be approximated by r =0.12.17
The interest payments of the finn are
(2)I =i B,.1
where B1 is the real debt of the firm at the end of period t-1. The calculation in this section
will assume a nominal interest rate i =0.08and an inflation rate of ii= 0.04.The resulting
four percent real interest rate is in line with experience for medium term debt of high quality
bus mess borrowers.
The foreign government levies a tax on the income of this subsidiary at a statutory rate
of t,The actual tax on the profits generated by an additional unit of capital depends on
depreciation rules and on any investment tax credit as well as on the statutory tax rate. This tax
'6A firm that equalizes the after-tax return in the parent company and the subsidiary will
also equalize the pretax returns if tax rates and leverage are the same in both countries.
'7See Feldstein, Poterba and Dicks-Mireaux (1983) for evidence about the pretax real
return on capital.
13rate on the profit generated by an additional until of capital will be denoted t2.The total tax
levied on the subsidiary by the foreign government is thus:
(3) T1 =t2r K1.1-
t1i B11
since the full nominal interest expense is deductible at the statutory tax rate. The analysis that
follows will assume that the statutory tax rate levied by the foreign government ist1 =0.40and
the tax rate on the return to capital is t2 =0.3O.'
The net accounting profit of the subsidiary (before recognizing the inflation erosion of
the subsidiary's debt) is therefore
(4) N, =rK11 -iB11 T1
=(l—t2)r K1.1 —(1—t1)i B1.
The subsidiary pays a fraction, d, of its accounting profits in dividends and retains the
rest:2°
(5) D1= dN1.
Based on recent experience, the current analysis assumes d =0.7.
The real retained earnings of the subsidiary is the sum of the nominalaccounting earnings
'8Note that t2 would be the effective tax rate in the absence of debt finance.
'9See Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (1991) and Jun(1994)
for evidence on the statutory and effective tax rates.
2°The dividend payout rate might instead be stated as a fraction of net economicprofits
defmed by adding the inflation erosion of the debt to the nominalaccounting profits. In
practice firms appear to base dividends on accounting profits. Since thispaper is not
concerned with the effect of variations in inflation, the payout rate could be redefined relative
to the economic income measure by changing the value of d withoutany substantial effect on
the numerical results.
14that are not repatriated as dividends and the inflation erosion of the debt. 21
(6)RE, =(1-d)N1 + r B1.1
If the subsidiary has a constant marginal ratio of debt to capital equal to b, these retained
earnings will induce an increase in the subsidiary's debt equal to
(7)B, - B1 = [b/(1-b)] RE1.
Sincethe evidence of section 1suggestedthat the parent firm's initial investment plus the
associated retained earnings total about 40 percent of the finance of the capital stock of the
foreign affiliate, the simplified analysis of this section will assume that the remainder represents
the debt supplied by foreigners: b=0.6. Section 3 extends the analysis by including the debt
capital supplied by the parent fuin and the equity participation by the foreign firm.
Finally, the capital stock of the subsidiary grows by the accumulation of retained earnings
as augmented by the increased debt:
(8)K, =K11+ [1/(1-b)] RE,.
The iiodel can be consolidated to yield a two-variable first order difference equation
system in terms of K, and B1 with initial conditions K0 =E0andB0 =[b/(l-b)]K0. This system
is then used to calculate the time path of dividends and therefore the present value of those
dividends discounted at the rate of return on capital, r =0.12.
With these parameter values Er =0.12;i= 0.08; 7= 0.04;t1 =0.4;t2 =0.3;d
0.7 ; and b =0.61,the present value of the repatriated dividends (discounting at r =0.12)is
21The erosion of the debt increases the value of the equity owners at the expense of the
creditors.
155. l6.The present value of the repatriated dividends thus exceeds the displaced capital by a
multiple of more than 5to1. The present value of U.S. national income rises by more than $4
for every dollar of U.S. foreign direct investment.
More relevant perhaps is the calculation that the present value of repatriated dividends
(discounting at 12 percent) exceeds the value of the displaced capital before the end of 13 years,
indicating that the longer term growth assumptions of the model are not relevant to the basic
conclusion that the national value of the foreign direct investment exceeds its opportunity cost.
Other measures confirm that the foreign direct investment has a high return to the United States.
The crudest method is the simple payback period: the undiscounted sum of accumulated
repatriated dividends per dollar of initial foreign investment exceeded one within eight years.
The internal rate of return that discounts the repatriated dividends to the initial investment is a
very high 19.7 percent.
3. Sensitivity to Alternative SDecificatipns
This section extends the analysis of section 2 to a more realistic model in which foreign
firms provide equity capital as well as debt finance and in which U.S. firms provide debt finance
as well as equity capital. The parameters of the basic case are chosen to reflect the experience
of U.S. foreign affiliates that was described in Table 1. The key parameters of this model are
The present value is calculated numerically by discoupting the dividends to a horizon
of 300 years. The present value is still rising at that point, although very slowly. The series
converges since the largest latent root of the system that determines D1 is 1 .09 and therefore
less than the discount factor (1.12). This is also clear from the behavior of the present
value which rises from 4.77 with a 150 year horizon to 5.01 with a 200 year horizon and
5.16 with a 300 year horizon.
16then varied to show the sensitivity of the results to changes in leverage ratios, taxes, inflation,
the real rate of return on capital and the dividend payout rate. In all of the specifications with
realistic leverage ratios, the advantage of leverage outweighs the loss of tax revenue and the
outbound foreign direct investment raises the present value of U.S. national income.
The basic specification of the full financial structure model starts with the same key
parameter values used in the simpler model of section. The real pretax return on the capital
stock of the foreign affiliate is r =0.12.The affiliate borrows at a nominal interest rate of i
=0.08and there is an inflation rate of r =0.04.The statutory tax rate imposed by the foreign
government is at t1 =0.40and the effective tax rate on incremental returns to unleveraged
equity capital is t2 =0.30.The affiliate pays 70 percent of its net income in dividends.
The two key differences between the full financial structure model and the simpler model
of section 2 are in the specification of the sources of equity and debt capital. The evidence
presented in Table 1 shows that U.S. parent companies and other U.S. investors provided $203
billion of external equity capital of U.S. affiliates while non-U.S. investors provided $92 billion
of external equity capital. This division will be modeled as 70 percent U.S. equity and 30
percent foreign equity. The retained earnings and dividends are therefore divided in this same
ratio, implying that equation 5ofsection 2 is replaced by
(9) D= 0.7d N,
where D1 is the dividend payment to U.S. investors.
Table 1 also shows that the U.S. and other U.S. investors provided $47 billion of debt
while non-U.S. sources provided $567 billion of debt. Taken together, the debt represents 49.6
percent of the capital stock. This will be approximated by a U.S. debt to capital ratio of =
170.04 and a foreign source debt to capital ratio of b*0.46. Interest payments will be divided
so that U.S. creditors receive 8 percent of the interest payments and foreign creditors receive
92 percent of the interest payments.
The effect of foreign direct investment on the annual value of U.S. national income is
the sum of the dividend repatriations and the U.S. interest receipts reduced by the incremental
lending from U.S. sources:
D, +[bL,/(b,+b)]iB1-[b,/(b,+b)]RE,
These annual net flows to the United States are discounted at the real return on the foregone
U.S. investment, assumed again to be equal to the real return on the capital of the foreign
affiliate (r). The foreign direct investment increases the present value of U.S. national income
if the present value of the dividends and interest exceeds the value of the U.S. cross border
capital outflow that financed that investment. Since the debt to capital ratio is taken to be 0.5
andtheU.S. investors finance 70 percent of the equity and 8 percent of the debt, the U.S.
external investment is 39 percent of the initial capital.
With this specification, the analysis shows that each dollar of U.S. capital outflow adds
$1.72 in present value to U.S. national income. Thus each dollar of outboundforeign
investment increases the present value of U.S. national income by nearly 72 cents. The internal
rate of return on the foreign investment from the point of view of the United States is 15.1
percent or 3.1 percentage points higher than the 12 percent assumed opportunity cost of the
capital. The accumulated value of the interest and dividend receipts (net of the additional
lending from U.S. sources) exceeds the initial investment in the tenth year and the present value
of the interest and dividend receipts exceeds the initial investment in the 22ndyear.
18The full financial structure analysis confirms the implication of the simpler model of
section 2 that outbound foreign direct investment raises U.S. national income because the
advantage of using foreign capital exceeds the loss of revenue to the foreign government. The
extent of the advantage is lower with this full specification than in the simpler analysis of section
2 because the full specification recognizes that some of the foreign capital invested in the U.S.
affiliate is equity capital rather than debt. Raising the debt to capital ratio of the affiliate to the
same 60 percent share that was assumed in the model of section 2 (while keeping the U.S.
fraction of that debt unchanged at 8 percent) increases the present value of U.S. receiptsper
dollar of initial U.S. investment to $4.23, nearly as high as the $5.16 in the calculation of table.
This analysis is summarized as case 2 in Table 2. The present value exceeds the initial
investment in the 16th year (in contrast to the 13th year in section 2) and the internal rate of
return is nearly as high at 18.5 percent (in contrast to 19.7 percent).
This case shows that it is the extent of the leverage (the overall debt to capital ratio) and
not the presence of foreign equity or U.S. debt that accounts for the substantial decline between
the simpler analysis of section 2 and the full financial specification. The same point is made
even more dramatically in case 3 which assumes no leverage at all.Since the foreign
government taxes 30 percent of the return to capital and there is no offsetting leverage
advantage, the foreign investment lowers U.S. national income. The present value per dollar
of outbound investment is only 62 cents and the internal rate of return is 8.4 percent (the 12
percent pretax return reduced by the 30 percent effective tax rate, ti).
19Table 2
Parameter Sensitivity with Full Financial Structure
Case Parameter Specification Present Present Accumulated Internal
Value Value Interest and Rate of
per Dollar Exceeds Dividends Exceed Return
of Initial U.S. Initial U.S.Initial
Investment Investment Investment
($) (year) (year)
I. Basic specificationt 1.72 22 10 15.1
2. Increased leverage 4.23 16 9 18.5
(b= 0.048 bt= .552)
3. No leverage 0.62 —- 8.4
(bbt=0)
4. Noforeigntaxes 3.12 14 8 18.9
(t1 =t2=0)
5. Noleverageortaxes 1.00 11 12.0
(b=b*= t1 =t2=0)
6. Higher inflation 2.49 21 10 16.0
(7= 0.06i =0.10)
7. Higher real interest rate 1.48 26 11 14.3
(7= 0.04i =0.10)
8. Lower real return 1.82 28 12 12.6
(r =0.10)
9. Equal foreign tax rates 1.36 30 11 13.7
(t1 =t2=0.35)
10.Lower dividend payout 2.58 28 12 15.2
(d= 0.5)
tflase case parameters: r =0.12j= 0.08=0.04b =0.04b =0.46F0 =0.7EQ4 =0.3
=0.40t2 =0.30d =0.7.Present values calculated at discount rate r. See text for definitions.
(tlfdi.4)
20At the opposite extreme, maintaining the base case debt ratio (b + b* =0.5)but
eliminating the foreign taxes (case 4 of Table 2) raises the rate of return to the U.S. to 18.9
percent and the present value per dollar of outbound capital flow to $3.12.
Of course, when there are neither taxes nor leverage (case 5),theU.S. receives exactly
the full 12 percent pretax return and the present value of the dividends is exactly one.
An increase in the rate of inflation with a corresponding rise in the nominal interest rate
that keeps the real interest rate unchanged raises the gain to the U.S. from foreign direct
investment (case 6). This occurs because the deductibility of nominal interest payments reduces
the overall effective rate of tax levied by the foreign government, i.e., because the real tax
deduction associated with the same real interest payments is increased.
Raising the rate of interest paid by the affiliate to foreign (and U.S.) providers of debt
finance from 8 percent to 10 percent without raising the rate of inflation (case 7) does, of
course, lower the advantage of U.S. outbound foreign direct investment to the United States.
But even in this case of a very high 6.0 percent real interest rate, the observed leverage is
sufficient to offset the taxes paid to the foreign government and to cause the U.S. investment to
raise the present value of U.S. national income.
Another feature of the basic specification and of actual experience in the international
economy is that the statutory tax rate exceeds the effective tax rate on new equity investments
in plant and equipment because of accelerated depreciation, investment credits, and other special
This favorable effect could be offset to the extent that a higher rate of inflation reduced
the present value of the depreciation allowances and thereby increased t2. See Feldstein
(1983) for an analysis of the several ways in which inflation can affect the return to
investors in a closed economy.
21features. This is reflected in the analysis in a relatively conservative way by the specification
that the statutory rate is 40 percent while the effective rate on the return to equity capital is only
30 percent (t1 =0.40and t2 =0.30).The analysis of case 9 shows eliminating the difference
between the statutory and the effective tax rates and setting both rates to 35 percent (t =
= 0.35)reduces the advantage of outbound investment but still leaves a net gain and internal
rate of return of 13.7 percent.
The final analysis (case 10) reduces the dividend payout rate from 70 percent to 50
percent. This lower payout rate substantially increases the advantage of outbound investment
because it causes a greater amount of capital accumulation in the affiliate per initial dollar of
outbound capital flow. With the reduced dividend payment it takes a bit longer to achieve a
present value equal to the outbound investment flow (28 years instead of 22 years) but the
eventual present value is substantially higher.
4. Concluding Comments
This paper has developed a framework for evaluating the impact of outbound foreign
direct investment on the present value of the national income of the home country and used that
framework with realistic parameters based on the experience of U.S. majority-owned affiliates.
The resulting calculations imply that a dollar of cross-border investment outflow raises the
present value of U.S. national income by a rather substantial amount. In the base case, each
outbound dollar of investment adds $1.72 cents to the present value of national income, nearly
double the opportunity cost of those funds.
This estimate assumes that each dollar of outbound foreign direct investment reduces the
22gross domestic investment in the United States by a dollar, i. .e, that there is no net offsetting
change in the net flow of international portfolio investment or in U.S. domestic saving. If either
of those occur, the opportunity cost of the outbound investment would be lower and the relative
advantage higher.
Similarly, the calculation assumes that the displaced private investment in the United
States would have earned the same real pretax rate of return as the capital in the affiliate. In
practice, some of the displaced outbound investment may come from housing and other types
of investment that are favored by U.S. tax laws in a way that causes their pretax rates of return
to be lower than the return on new plant, equipment, and inventories. This would also cause
the current calculation to understate the national income gain by the United States of this
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